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We estimate the impact of extra health insurance coverage beyond a National Health
System on the demand for several health services. Traditionally, the literature has tried to
deal with the endogeneity of the private (extra) insurance decision by ﬁnding instrumental
variables.Sinceaprioriinstrumentalvariablesarehardtoﬁndwetakeadifferentapproach.
We focus on the most common health insurance plan in Portugal, ADSE, which is given
to all civil servants and their dependents. We argue that this insurance is exogenous, i.e.,
not correlated with the beneﬁciaries’ health status. This identifying assumption allows us
to estimate the impact of having ADSE coverage on the demand for three different health
services using a matching estimator technique. The health services used are number of
visits, number of blood and urine tests, and the probability of visiting a dentist. Results
show large positive effects of ADSE coverage for number of visits and tests among the
young (18–30 years old) but only the latter is statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero.
The effects represent 21.8% and 30% of the average number of visits and tests for the young.
On the contrary, we ﬁnd no evidence of moral hazard on the probability of visiting a dentist.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The widespread usage—by health insurance companies, and governments—of copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles
as mechanisms to control health-care spending reﬂects the belief that the demand for health care reacts to price. The
literature, however, has not yet produced irrefutable evidence on the magnitude of this reaction.
By decreasing the price-per-service faced by patients, health insurance increases health-care demand whenever demand
is elastic relative to price. The potential effect of health insurance on demand for health services—usually denoted by moral
hazard—was ﬁrst identiﬁed by Arrow (1963).1 The ﬁrst study to show the impact of insurance on the demand for health
servicesinanexperimentalsettingwastheRANDHealthInsuranceExperiment(RHIE)(e.g.,Manningetal.,1987;Newhouse,
1993).TheRHIEreceivedcriticismsforitsdesign,reﬂectingthedifﬁcultyofimplementinganexperimentwhenhealthmaybe
at stake. The greatest advantage of the RHIE relative to subsequent studies is the randomization of the insurance type across
individuals. Randomization establishes the exogeneity of the insurance status and allows the identiﬁcation of the increase
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 916249571; fax: +34 916249875.
E-mail address: matilde.machado@uc3m.es (M.P. Machado).
1 Meza (1983) criticizes attributing this effect solely to moral hazard. Vera-Hern´ andez (1999) follows the same line of argument. Moral hazard is the
difference in demand of an insured individual with and without perfect information. Of course, the latter situation is not observed. A positive impacto n
demand from additional insurance is compatible with but is not proof of moral hazard.
1in health services utilization with moral hazard. Since the RHIE, many researchers have turned to ﬁeld data to estimate
the effect of health insurance on health-care demand. In non-experimental settings, however, the decision to buy (extra)
insurance is not random but depends on the characteristics of the individual. In particular, the higher the individual’s risk,
the higher is the optimal insurance coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). For example, within a National Health Insurance
System, individuals who contract private insurance are likely to be those who anticipate, based on private information, a
higher-than-average demand for health care (Cameron et al., 1988; Vera-Hern´ andez, 1999). Ignoring that adverse selection
causes the private health insurance variable to be endogenous leads to an overestimation of its impact on the demand for
health services.
The traditional way to deal with the endogeneity of the private (or extra) insurance is to ﬁnd instrumental variables,
which should be correlated with the decision to contract additional insurance but not correlated with the use of health
services.2 Bago d’Uva and Santos Silva (2002) argue that the only such variables are those related to an individual’s risk
aversion. Unfortunately, it is hard to ﬁnd such variables in most health surveys. Some authors, e.g., Vera-Hern´ andez (1999)
and Holly et al. (2002), have used socioeconomic variables as instruments for the insurance decision with limited suc-
cess. While Holly’s work is still unﬁnished, Vera-Hern´ andez’s coefﬁcient estimates suffer from high standard deviations
that hamper any meaningful conclusions about the true impact of the private insurance on the demand for physician
services.
Screening by insurance companies and supply-induced demand by health-care providers (Holly et al., 1998) are other
potential sources of bias. Screening would bias the effect from insurance on utilization downwards, while supply-induced
demand would bias it upwards. Our data do not suffer from screening biases but may be subject to supply-induced demand.
We think the latter is of no consequence in our context because the insurer’s payments to providers are relatively low.
Nonetheless, ﬁnding that extra coverage from private (or extra) insurance within a public National Health System increases
the demand for health care is consistent with both moral hazard and supply-induced demand.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the impact of additional insurance coverage on the demand for health care within a
National Health System (NHS) using the data from the Portuguese Health Survey (1998–1999).3 The main contributions of
this paper to the literature lie in the different approach we take to measure the impact of insurance. First, we use a dataset
in which approximately 10% of individuals are covered by an extra insurance plan that is unrelated to their current health
status.Theexogeneityofthiscoverageremovestheneedtouseinstrumental-variableestimation.Morespeciﬁcally,wefocus
on the most common health insurance plan in the country (ADSE), which is given to all civil servants and their dependents.4
ADSE beneﬁciaries have double coverage since they also have access to the NHS just like any other citizen.
Second, we use a matching estimator technique (Abadie and Imbens, 2006a) that does not impose any functional form on
the impact of health insurance on the demand for health services and allows for heterogeneous impacts. The control group
is composed of individuals covered by the NHS alone, and the treated group is composed of individuals who are also covered
by ADSE.5
Third, we estimate the impact of additional insurance on several health services. Traditionally, the literature has focused
on “number of visits to the doctor.” We believe there is measurement error in this variable: a visit is not a homogeneous
service, and may vary in quality and duration. More importantly, the measurement error may be correlated with insurance
status. For example, those with additional (or private) insurance may have access to better quality and longer visits. In
our case, it is also possible that number of visits to the doctor is subject to inducement since ADSE pays doctors per visit.
Alternatively, we estimate the impact of additional health insurance on the “number of blood and urine tests” as well as
on “at least one visit to the dentist in 12 months.” Relative to number of visits to the doctor, the former is a more objective
and homogeneous measure; in particular its quality is independent of insurance status. It is possible, however, that ADSE
doctors use the number of diagnostic tests to justify more visits, so this measure could be subject to demand-inducement.
In contrast, it is less likely that “at least one visit to the dentist in 12 months” would be affected by inducement since ADSE
pays dentists by type of procedure and not by visit.
Fourth, since some individuals in our treated group may have been subjected to treatment for a long period of time, we
splitthesampleintodifferentagegroupstocontrolforbiasthatmayariseiftheeffectsfrombettertreatmentaccumulateover
time.If,forexample,ADSEbeneﬁciarieshavebetter(unobserved)healthbecausetheyhavehadaccesstobettertreatmentfor
long periods of time, we would expect health differences between the treated and control groups to increase with age. While
theyoungindividualswithaccesstoadditionalinsurancemaynothavehadthetimetoaccumulatemorehealthbeneﬁts,itis
plausiblethatamongtheoldergenerationthetreatedarehealthierthantheirNHS-onlycounterparts.Byreportingtheresults
for different age groups we are also trying to separate the “immediate effect” of treatment from its cumulative effect. The
presence of a dynamic effect and the effort to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects of treatments is, as far
as we know, innovative in this literature. We believe this estimation strategy may also be of some relevance in experimental
settings where individuals are subject to treatment for different durations.
2 An exception within studies using ﬁeld data is Chiappori et al. (1998), who use longitudinal data from a natural experiment in France.
3 “Inqu´ erito Nacional de Sa´ ude 98/99”. Data have been collected from October 1998 to September 1999.
4 Civil servants in Portugal are employed for life. This is the main advantage of becoming a civil servant. Moreover, at least at the lower end of qualiﬁcation
the government pays higher salaries than the private sector.
5 A drawback of the matching technique is the lack of estimates for the effects of exogenous variables beyond the treatment.
2The more conservative average treatment effects (ATT) estimates for the overall sample are 0.096 for number of visits,
which corresponds to 6% of the average number of visits but is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero; and 0.057 for
number of tests, which corresponds to 15.8% of the average number of tests, and is statistically signiﬁcantly different from
zero. Results show that the ATT for number of tests is more precisely estimated than the ATT for number of visits. The ATTs
for both number of visits and number of tests for the youngest group are large, representing 21.8% and 30% of the youngest
group average number of visits and tests, respectively. However, only the latter is close to being statistically signiﬁcantly
different from zero. The effects for other age groups are smaller and not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero, which
may constitute evidence that ADSE beneﬁciaries accumulate health beneﬁts over time. For at least one visit to the dentist,
the ATT is smaller and not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. We interpret the latter result in light of Chiappori et
al. (1998), who argued that for services where the nonmonetary costs were high the demand would be more inelastic.
Finally, we provide some evidence of the exogeneity of the treatment by taking a sample of individuals, the unemployed,
who have double coverage through a family member and compare them with the unemployed from the control group. The
effect of treatment on the unemployed’s demand for health services should primarily reﬂect moral hazard (and/or supply-
induced demand) and not adverse selection because it is unlikely that these individuals decided the job status of their family
members.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the recent literature on the subject and brieﬂy describes the
Portuguese health-care system; Section 3 describes the dataset; Section 4 makes an exploratory analysis of the data; Section
5 describes the matching estimator methodology; Section 6 describes the main results; Section 7 discusses the quality of
the matching and the plausibility of exogeneity of the ADSE status; and Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains tables
with results.
2. Background
2.1. Review of the literature
In most settings, ignoring the role of adverse selection in the decision to obtain private or additional insurance will lead
to an overestimation of the moral hazard effect in the demand for health-care services. The traditional way of controlling for
this potential bias is to use instrumental variables (e.g., Cameron et al., 1988; Coulson et al., 1995; Holly et al., 1998; Vera-
Hern´ andez,1999;SavageandWright,2003).Theeconometricmodelusedtoestimatetheimpactofinsuranceonhealth-care
utilization varies substantially in the literature, depending both on the characteristic of the dependent variable (e.g., count
or binary) and the convenience of the model. For example, Cameron et al. (1988) start with a Negbin speciﬁcation but switch
to a linear speciﬁcation when they instrument for the insurance variable. The typical instruments used are socioeconomic
variables that tend to be associated more with the insurance decision than with health-care utilization. It is hard, however,
to justify that any of these variables is an appropriate instrument. While Vera-Hern´ andez (1999) justiﬁes the use of these
variables as instrumental variables by deriving a structural model of demand for health care and insurance, Bago d’Uva and
Santos Silva (2002) argue that the appropriate instruments should be (unobserved) variables related to risk aversion which
are absent from most datasets. Because appropriate instrumental variables are hard to ﬁnd, Chiappori et al. (1998) avoid
using them by relying on a natural experiment in France. Our paper also avoids the use of instrumental variables and instead
argues that the civil servant insurance scheme in Portugal (ADSE) is exogenous to the beneﬁciaries’ health.6
Two other potential sources of endogeneity of insurance status have received little attention in the literature, perhaps
because their perceived effects are small. The ﬁrst one is screening by private insurance companies. Screening consists of
denying insurance coverage to the highest risk individuals. The second source is supply-induced demand. A doctor/hospital
may induce more demand from those patients holding more generous insurance since these patients pay a smaller fraction
of the fees. The inducement of demand is likely to be stronger when insurance companies pay a fee-for-service to doctors or
hospitals. If insurance choice is affected only by screening from insurance companies, then ignoring this effect may lead to
an underestimation of the moral hazard effect (Coulson et al., 1995). The literature has not paid attention to this potential
bias. Finally, when supply-induced demand is correlated with insurance status, the estimated effect of moral hazard will,
most likely, be biased upwards.7 The estimates of price elasticities in a context with high incentives to induce demand in
Van de Voorde et al. (2001) are, in general, similar to those obtained in the RHIE. The authors conclude that, at least in the
short-run, the level of demand inducement is low.
Mostoftheempiricalliteraturehasshownevidenceofbothmoralhazardandadverseselectioninthehealth-caremarket.
The literature has also shown that the level of moral hazard differs across health services. Cameron et al. (1988), using data
for Australia, ﬁnd that for a broad range of services more generous coverage leads to higher utilization because of both moral
hazard and adverse selection. Savage and Wright (2003), also for Australia, ﬁnd that private insurance increases hospital
length of stay. Vera-Hern´ andez (1999), using data for a Spanish region, ﬁnds different evidence for heads-of-household than
6 We recently became aware of simultaneous work by Trujillo et al. (2005), in which the authors rely on a propensity score matching approach, similar
to our matching estimator, to evaluate the impact of a social subsidy on the demand for health care from the poor in Colombia.
7 Presumably doctors/hospitals induce more demand from those patients who have more generous coverage. It is possible, however, that the level of
inducement is directly related to the amount the insurer pays to the doctor/hospital for the visit, in which case the bias may be reversed.
3for non-heads-of-household. For heads-of-household, presumably those who make the insurance decision, there is evidence
of adverse selection but no evidence of moral hazard. In contrast, for other household members, there is evidence of moral
hazard. More recently, Olivella and Vera-Hern´ andez (2005) and Gardiol et al. (2005) show signiﬁcant evidence of adverse
selection using data from the British household panel survey and Swiss health insurance claims, respectively. Coulson et al.
(1995) ﬁnd that supplemental insurance increases the number of prescriptions ﬁlled among the elderly in the United States
(i.e. moral hazard) but do not ﬁnd evidence of adverse selection. Holly et al. (1998), using data for Switzerland, ﬁnd evidence
of both adverse selection and moral hazard in hospital stays. Deb and Trivedi (2002) use data from the RHIE where the
insurance choice is exogenous. They ﬁnd that, everything else held constant, an increase in the coinsurance rate decreases
utilization, although this effect is only statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level. Finally, Chiappori et al.
(1998)ﬁnd evidence of moral hazard for general practitioner (GP) home visits but not for ofﬁce visits to a GP or to a specialist.
The authors argue that the presence of high nonmonetary costs associated with ofﬁce visits translates a small change in price
into a negligible change in the total cost borne by the patient. On the contrary, for GP home visits, the nonmonetary costs
are virtually inexistent, making a small change in price more noticeable.
Most studies control for an individual’s subjective assessment of health status because these are strong predictors of
health services utilization (e.g., Cameron et al., 1988; Coulson et al., 1995; Vera-Hern´ andez, 1999). These variables, however,
are likely to be endogenous, i.e., correlated with the unobserved variables in the health demand equation. Windmeijer and
Santos Silva (1997) suggest using long-term determinants of health, such as smoking and drinking, as instruments for the
subjective health measures. In this paper, we present results with and without matching on subjective health measures
but give more credibility to those without subjective measures. In Appendix A we provide a theoretical motivation for not
including subjective health variables in the regressions.
2.2. The Portuguese health-care system
The Portuguese National Health Service (NHS) was instituted in 1979 when legislation established the right of all citizens
to health protection, a guaranteed right to universal free health care through the NHS, and access to the NHS for all citizens
regardless of economic and social status.8
Before1979,thestateonlycoveredthecostsofhealthcareforcivilservants,andprovidedlimitedpreventivecare,maternal
and child health care, and mental health treatment, as well as some control of infectious diseases. Therefore, the evolution of
the health system in Portugal implies that the elder cohorts of ADSE beneﬁciaries received relatively better access to health
care in comparison with their NHS-only counterparts. Our results by age group show that the impact of ADSE is higher for
the youngest generation while smaller and not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero for the older groups. This result
is compatible with the elderly ADSE beneﬁciaries being (unobservably) healthier than their NHS-only matches.
After 1979, some aspects of the pre-NHS period remained such as the health subsystems (from the Portuguese subsis-
temas). These are health insurance schemes for which membership is based on professional or occupational category. Bentes
et al. (2004) state that these schemes were kept because trade unions were not willing to give up the good service and easy
accesstoawiderangeofproviders.Asaconsequence,by2004about25%ofthepopulationhad,inadditiontotheNHS,cover-
age from some of the health subsystems (for a brief description of these health subsystems see Bentes et al., 2004 pp. 21–24).
The largest subsystem and the focus of our paper, ADSE, covers 15% of the population including all employees of the NHS.
This is a compulsory scheme for civil servants for which they pay 1% of their salary. ADSE beneﬁciaries have access to three
types of assistance. First, ADSE has agreements with providers through which the beneﬁciaries enjoy reduced copayments.
Second, the beneﬁciaries may decide to choose a provider outside the ADSE agreement network in which case they would
pay a higher copayment. Finally, ADSE beneﬁciaries may also beneﬁt from all services offered by the NHS network subject to
the same small copayments and exemptions as any user of the NHS. According to Bentes et al. (2004), generally the subsys-
tems offer better beneﬁts than the NHS. The NHS is predominantly funded through general taxation. The health subsystems
are funded through employer and employee contributions although, for example, the ADSE needs to be supplemented with
money from the government budget.
After 1992, hospitals and health centers started requiring small copayments from NHS users. However, a substantial
fraction of NHS users are exempt.9 Copayments and spending on private doctor visits are partially deductible from income
taxes (at a 30% rate), which means they are a de facto subsidy by the state. Copayments in the NHS are homogeneous across
specialties and only vary with the nature of the visit—emergency visits are more expensive—and with the type of health-care
center—visits at central and larger hospitals are more expensive. Copayments in the NHS range between two euros for GP
visits at the local health-care center and ﬁve euros for emergency visits to general hospitals. Diagnostic tests are also subject
to copayments.10
8 This Section will borrow heavily from Bentes et al. (2004), which describes at length the Portuguese Health System from its beginning until 2002.
9 NHS users exempt from copayments are people with low incomes, the unemployed, the chronically ill, pregnant women, children up to 12 years old,
drug abusers under treatment, and the mentally ill. Current estimates put their numbers somewhere in the interval 40–50% of the population.
10 Source: http://www.arsc.online.pt/scripts/cv.dll?sec=sns&pass=guia utente#15. Law published in 1992 (Portaria no 338/92, 11 April). The more recent
legal document is Portaria no. 395-A/2007, 30 March 2007.
4Although the NHS is expected to offer all services demanded, in practice there is very limited provision of certain services
such as dental care for adults. Adults demanding dental care usually consult a private dentist. Bentes et al. (2004) report that,
accordingtothe1995–1996HealthSurvey,92%ofalldentistvisitsareprivate.ForADSEbeneﬁciaries,thecoverageforprivate
dentists with no ADSE agreement is 80% up to a limit, and the copayment for dentists with ADSE agreements depends on
the speciﬁc treatment but varies between 0.95 and 9.18 euros with no limit. Legally, NHS-only beneﬁciaries may get partial
reimbursements for their dentist visits and treatments, but these are so low that few people take the trouble to ﬁll out the
paperwork. In short, for dental care ADSE beneﬁciaries face a much better coverage than their NHS-only counterparts who
are, in practice, left without coverage.
The number of services provided through the private sector has been growing steadily and in 1998–1999 accounted for
about 32% of the specialist visits, while the public sector accounted for a wide majority of the GP visits (Bentes et al., 2004).
While the percentage of private hospitals beds is only about 23% of total stock, the presence of the private sector in dental




proportional to their population. Within each of the smallest geographical area levels, containing around 300 households,
random draws select those households to be interviewed.
The dataset includes information on sociodemographic characteristics, income levels, doctor and hospital visits, medical
procedures, expenditures on physician services, objective and subjective measures of health status (e.g., obesity and “feels in
very good health”), and consumption habits that may affect health (e.g., tobacco and alcohol consumption). Finally, there is
alsoinformationaboutthehealthinsurancestatusofeachindividual.MostindividualsareonlybeneﬁciariesofthepublicNHS
(84%), followed by civil servants and their dependents who are beneﬁciaries of ADSE (9.99%), those with private insurance
(1.7%), and those who are linked to the military and the police who have up to ﬁve different insurance schemes.11 We use
three different variables to capture the demand for health services: (1) the number of physician visits in the previous 3
months; (2) the number of blood and urine tests in the previous 3 months; and (3) whether the individual has visited the
dentist in the last year. Importantly, a serious drawback of this dataset is that there is no indication of how many of the visits
or tests were done in the private sector and how many were done in the NHS.
We obtain our working sample after dropping a few observations from the data. We drop seven observations correspond-
ing to situations where the insurance status of the individual was not known. We drop 191 observations of pregnant women
whose visits to the doctor were related to the pregnancy. We deleted observations with inconsistent answers including 40
individuals who declare not to have visited the doctor in the previous 3 months but who also report going to a private doctor,
health center, or hospital. Survey information may be provided by a different person in the household; therefore, to avoid
potential measurement errors or missing values, we restrict our sample to observations where the individual answers for
himself, which excludes minors under the age of 15 from the sample as well as another 165 observations provided by non-
family members. We also dropped 2854 observations corresponding to people with special insurance status different from
ADSE and the National Health System. These observations correspond to the military (1.09%), the police forces (1.45%), the
judicial system employees and their dependents (0.29%), banking employees and their dependents (1.38%), as well as people
with private insurance (1.7%). We decided to delete all these insurance types from the control group because the insurance
coverage and copayments may differ from the rest of the control group, which may affect the beneﬁciaries’ behavior, and
because there may be non-observable variables correlated with the insurance type that may also affect individuals’ behavior.
Wealsodeleteobservationswithmissingvaluesontheexogenousvariablesused.Inthecasewewishtoincludeavariable
withtoomanymissingvaluessuchasthedailywineconsumption(inlitres),wecreateadummyvariable(winens)thatequals
one whenever the variable wine is missing, and zero otherwise. Altogether, our working samples range from 21,151 to 21,908
observations.
4. Preliminary and exploratory analysis of the data
Inthissectionweperformaverypreliminaryanalysisofthedata.Table1showssomestatisticsrelativetotheﬁrstmeasure
of health-care services, number of visits to a doctor in the previous 3 months. The second column of Table 1 shows that,
regardlessoftheirinsurancestatus,53%ofthepeoplehadatleastonevisittothedoctorintheprevious3months.Thep-value
of the t-test indicates that the unconditional probability of at least one visit does not signiﬁcantly differ across insurance
types.However,astheﬁrstcolumnofTable1alsoshows,theaveragenumberofvisitstothedoctorissigniﬁcantlysmallerfor
the beneﬁciaries of ADSE than for those with the NHS-only. The higher number of visits for the beneﬁciaries of the NHS-only
may reﬂect the requirement that an individual visits a GP before visiting a specialist, which is not a requirement for the ADSE
11 The data also contain information regarding the risks covered by the insurance plan for those individuals who declare having insurance. Only 4.77% of
the respondents declare having insurance, which reﬂects a lack of understanding of the health system.
5beneﬁciaries. This requirement is one of the main reasons why we consider visits to the doctor to be a less-than-perfect
variable to study the prevalence of moral hazard in this context.
In order to circumvent the potential measurement error in number of visits, we also analyze the number of blood and
urine tests. Statistics for the number of tests are shown in Table 2. The unconditional mean number of tests for the ADSE
group is signiﬁcantly higher than the mean number of tests for the NHS-only group.
Another measure of interest is dental services. ADSE offers a generous coverage for dental services, while the NHS-only
beneﬁciaries, in practice, visit private dentists and pay the full fee. As expected, the unconditional probability of having at
least one visit to the dentist in the previous 12 months is signiﬁcantly higher for the ADSE group than for the NHS-only
group, as Table 3 shows.
The differences between the two types of insurance are greater if one looks at certain predetermined variables (see
Table 4). The NHS-only group is relatively poorer and older than the ADSE group. In the ADSE group there are fewer married
or widowed individuals and more single and divorced people than in the NHS-only group. The regional distribution of the
two groups is also unequal in the full sample. Civil servants are more concentrated in the capital and less concentrated in
the other areas of the country with the exception of Alentejo, which is the least densely populated region in the country.12
The ADSE group is more educated than the NHS-only group. The difference is even greater when the comparison involves
the no-student population of the two groups, since the ADSE group contains a larger proportion of students. The ADSE group
also contains fewer people who are out of the labor force, on sick leave for more than 3 months, not working for some other
reason, or unemployed. The percentage of people answering the questionnaire about himself/herself is statistically the same
in both insurance groups.
In the ADSE group people feel healthier than in the NHS-only group, as one can observe by the statistics on subjective
health on Table 5. This makes sense, since the presence of physical limitations and chronic diseases is more prevalent among
theNHS-onlygroupwiththeexceptionofallergies,whicharemorecommonamongtheADSEbeneﬁciaries.TheADSEgroup,
perhaps because of the younger age, practices more exercise, drinks less wine and beer and has fewer weight problems than
the NHS-only group. The percentage of smokers is, however, statistically the same in both groups. Finally, ADSE beneﬁciaries
practice better dental hygiene than the NHS-only group.
5. Methodology
OurtreatmentgroupiscomposedofADSEbeneﬁciariesandrepresentsroughly10%ofoursample.Thematchingestimator
proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006a) is used to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) i.e., the average
increaseinthedemandforhealthservicesamongADSEbeneﬁciariesduetotheirdoublecoverage.Weargueitisveryunlikely
that individuals want to become civil servants just to beneﬁt from ADSE health insurance since the NHS offers practically
universal service. Moreover, if health coverage were the main objective, other health subsystems, such as the one offered to
the banking sector employees and their dependents, offer much better coverage than ADSE. If our argument is true, then we
may rule out the existence of adverse selection in ADSE. It is also implausible for the state to choose individuals on the basis
of health variables unobserved to us. The hiring process for civil servants is highly regulated and starts with a public call
for applicants who need to fulﬁll certain criteria. Beyond being physically capable for the job, health status is not included
among the criteria, and more importantly, the candidate’s expected health status in the future is not taken into consideration
(e.g., genetic diseases).13 In short, we believe there are good arguments to discard selection bias in our ATT estimates.
OurATTestimatesmay,however,beabiasedestimateofmoralhazard.Ononehand,wemayunderestimatemoralhazard
if ADSE beneﬁciaries enjoy more or better treatment than NHS-only beneﬁciaries. For example, suppose civil servants enjoy
regular check-ups at their place of work and NHS-only beneﬁciaries do not.14 Over the individual’s life, this better treatment
would translate into a signiﬁcant accumulation of health advantages by the ADSE beneﬁciaries relative to their NHS-only
counterparts. In this case, the impact of ADSE should be larger for the younger beneﬁciaries who have not yet had the
time to accumulate health advantages, and smaller for the older beneﬁciaries who would be healthier than their NHS-only
matches and, therefore, demand fewer health services. In order to identify this effect we estimate the ATT for each age group
separately.
On the other hand, we may overestimate moral hazard if there is supply-induced demand for ADSE beneﬁciaries. Supply
inducement is more likely to occur in the number of visits to the doctor and in the number of tests, since ADSE pays doctors,
except dentists, per visit.15 However, the ADSE payments to doctors are low, so we believe the magnitude of this effect, if
positive, would be relatively small.
12 The ﬁve regional variables correspond to the ﬁve regional health administrations.
13 The law is written in Decreto-Lei no. 204/98, de 11.07, article 29. It requires candidates to perform a simple health test such as a simple chest X-ray to
dismiss those with tuberculosis. Tuberculosis, however, is extremely rare nowadays. Other jobs have similar or stringent requirements.
14 Notice that if the availability of regular check-ups were the difference in quality then civil servant dependents, who also are ADSE beneﬁciaries, would
not be entitled to this beneﬁt.
15 Doctors may request more tests in order to justify more visits. ADSE pays dentists by type of procedure and not per visit. Inducement by dentists would
then be reﬂected in a misreport of the type of services provided to the patient and not in the number of visits to the dentist.
6Finally, the positive impact of ADSE on the demand for health services may not be due to moral hazard but may be
the consequence of undertreatment in the NHS, for example due to the existence of capacity constraints. We discard this
interpretation since the Portuguese NHS has (and had already at the time of the survey) agreements with private providers
to deliver those services which the NHS is incapable of delivering.
Various methods of semiparametric estimation of average treatment effects under exogeneity have recently been pro-
posed in the econometric literature (see Imbens, 2004, for a review and references). In this paper, we apply matching
estimators in order to estimate the impact of having additional health insurance coverage on the demand for health services.
Matching estimators have not been applied before in this context, to our knowledge, and have the advantage of avoiding the
imposition of functional form restrictions.16 In particular, we apply the matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens
(2006a) (hereafter AI). While AI focus on covariate matching, many recent studies have relied on propensity score matching.
Baser (2006) offers a particularly useful guide in any empirical application to choose amongst the different propensity score
matchingestimators.Themainreasonfornotusingpropensityscorematchinginourpaperisthelackofavarianceestimator
when the propensity score is estimated rather than known, which explains why researchers very often use bootstrapping
methods. Abadie and Imbens (2006b), however, show that the standard bootstrap is generally invalid and provide, for the
time being, the only consistent and formally justiﬁed variance estimator. Furthermore, in order to validate our approach
and guarantee some robustness to our exercise we report the following: (1) different matching estimators, in particular we
show results based on simple matching and biased adjusted matching for one and four matches, M=1 and 4, respectively; (2)
resultsfortwodifferentspeciﬁcations:theﬁrstoneincludesalargesetofcontrols,someofwhichmaynotbeexogenous,and
a second one which restricts the controls to a subset, we believe, is exogenous. The estimated treatment effect on the treated
is larger with the ﬁrst speciﬁcation. In our conclusions, however, we put more emphasis on the more conservative results
obtained with the second speciﬁcation; (3) we provide statistics of the matching quality and of the overlapping distribution
of the propensity score between treated and control individuals, both of which reinsure us about our results.
The rest of this section follows closely AI, including their notation, assumptions and some terminology. We would like
to estimate the average effect of treatment, i.e. having ADSE health insurance coverage, on several measures of health-care
utilization: physician visits, number of tests and dentist visits within different time periods. Denote by Yi(0) the outcome
obtained by individual i, i=1 ,..., N, if under the control group (i.e., NHS-only), and Yi(1) the outcome individual i would
obtain if under the treatment group (i.e., ADSE). For each individual i we observe the triple (Wi,Xi,Yi), where Xi is a vector of
covariates, Wi ∈{0, 1} reﬂects whether individual i received treatment or not, and Yi, denotes the realized outcome:
Yi ≡ Yi(Wi) =

Yi(0) if Wi = 0
Yi(1) if Wi = 1.
(1)
The realized outcome is equal to the Yi(0) if the individual is not an ADSE beneﬁciary and equals Yi(1) otherwise. Note
that the treated outcome, Yi(1), is observed only for treated units, and the untreated outcome, Yi(0), is observed only for
comparison units. Hence, only one of the potential outcomes is observed for each individual and the other is unobserved.
We are interested in what AI denote the population average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) ( p,t) and in the sample
average treatment effect on the treated ( s,t):








i=1Wi stands for the number of individuals in the treated group. The main idea behind matching estimators
is that, if assignment to treatment is independent of the potential outcomes for individuals with similar values of the
covariates, the unobserved potential outcomes can be imputed by using only the outcomes of similar individuals of the
opposite treatment group. The following key assumptions about the treatment assignment are made:
Assumption 1. For all x in the support of X,
(i) (unconfoundedness) W is independent of (Y(0), Y(1)) conditional on X=x;
(ii) (overlap) c<Pr(W=1|X=x)<1−c, for some c.
As stated in AI, assumption 1 is referred to as strong ignorability (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The overlap assumption
requires that the conditional probability of receiving treatment, also known as the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983), is bounded away from zero and one. If (ii) does not hold, all individuals with a given covariate pattern would receive
the same treatment and there would be no similar individuals of the opposite treatment group. Our estimated propensity
score is actually bounded away from zero and one when considering the whole sample and also when we split the sample by
age groups. Fig. 1 in Appendix B shows the estimated propensity score for all treated and control units used in the matches.
16 Both matching and traditional regression analysis assume that selection into treatment is on the observables. Contrary to regression analysis, matching
does not make the linear functional form assumption. Moreover, if selection is actually on the observables but linearity does not hold, then matching
estimates are consistent, while regression estimates are not.
7Immediately, we see that the last bin for controls is empty, which may indicate a problem. Note, however, that this is no
longer the case when the propensity score is estimated separately by age groups, as shown in Figs. 2–4 also in Appendix
B. These ﬁgures suggest that, when carrying out our analyses separately by age groups, the degree of overlap is enough to
proceed with the estimation.
The unconfoundedness assumption, also known as selection on observables, implies:
E[Y(w)|X = x] = E[Y(w)|W = w,X = x] = E[Y|W = w,X = x]. (2)
This assumption is crucial because it allows to use the realized outcome of individuals with the same covariates values
from the opposite group. Thus, the average treatment effect can be recovered by averaging E[Y|W=1 ,X=x]−E[Y|W=0,X=x]
over the distribution of X.
We believe that the unconfoundedness assumption is reasonable in our context for the youngest age group but may be
violatedfortheeldestgroupduetounobservedhealthbeneﬁtsthatmayhaveaccumulatedovertimeforthetreatmentgroup.
This difference motivates the separate estimation of the ATTs by age-group. In this respect, however, it is worth remarking
that the NHS is available to everyone almost for free and is of relatively high quality. Furthermore, as argued in the beginning
of the section, it is unlikely that individuals anticipating a high health-care demand choose to become civil servants in order
to obtain ADSE coverage, just as it is unlikely that the state selects employees on the basis of their current or future health
status.
In many studies, the number of exogenous variables is large and an exact match may be impossible. Therefore, matching
is based on the observations that are close in terms of their covariate values. More precisely, let jm(i) be the index of the
individual that is the m-th closest match, in terms of covariates, to individual i based on the distance measure by the norm





 Xl − Xi ≤  Xj − Xi 

= m, (3)
where 1{·} is the indicator function.17 We will do matching with replacement, i.e. we allow each individual in the control
group to be used in more than one match since this technique produces matches of higher quality than matching without
replacement by increasing the set of possible matches.
The simple matching estimator for the ATT, estimates the missing potential outcomes Y(0) when Wi =1 as the average of
the outcomes of the nearest neighbors of control group:
ˆ Yi(0) =






Yj if Wi = 1,
(4)
where IM(i) denotes the set of indices for the ﬁrst M matches for individual i. Hence, the simple matching estimator for the
average treatment effect for the treated discussed in AI is:





(Yi − ˆ Yi(0)), (5)
where N1 denotes the number of treated individuals in the sample.
AI show that, due to matching discrepancies, this estimator has a bias of order O(N−1/K), where K is the number of
continuous covariates. They propose to combine the matching process with a regression adjustment in order to adjust the
differences within the matches for the differences in their covariate values. The adjustment is based on an estimate of the
regression function  w(x) ≡ E[Y(w)

X = x] for the control group W=0 since we are interested in estimating the ATT.18 Given
the estimated regression function for the controls, the missing potential outcomes are predicted as:
˜ Yi(0) =






(Yj + ˆ  0(Xi) − ˆ  0(Xj)) if Wi = 1,
(6)
The bias-corrected matching estimator of the ATT is then written as:





(Yi − ˜ Yi(0)). (7)
This bias adjustment makes matching estimators N1/2-consistent.19 Our application suggests that the bias obtained with
the simple matching estimator may be large.
17 These deﬁnitions can easily be generalized to allow for the presence of ties.
18 AI use nonparametric estimation to impute the value for the untreated.
19 For details on the properties of the matching estimators and their variance, see AI.
86. Results
In this section we show estimates for the ATT using different speciﬁcations.20
Table 6 shows results for number of visits to the doctor and number of tests when matching is done on a wide set of
covariates. We classify the set of covariates into two groups. Group 1 consists of individual characteristics such as age, female
dummy, marital status, number of family members, region dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, years of
schooling, employment status, occupational dummies, and up to 11 income level dummies; Group 2 consists of variables
that are more related to the individual’s health status or habits such as on-sick-leave for more than 3 months, on-sick-leave
forlessthan3months,otherreasonsfornotworking,dailyaverageconsumptionofwine(inlitres),underweight,overweight,
obesity, restricted activity, and diseases such as asthma, diabetes, bronchitis, allergies, high blood pressure, and back pain,
living habits such as exercise, smoking, and intake of sleeping pills, and subjective measures of health.
Table 7 shows the estimated ATT when we restrict the variables used for matching to the variables in group 1, and a
few variables in group 2 such as asthma, allergies, and diabetes, which we believe are exogenous in this context.21 The
other variables in group 2 are potentially problematic. For example, there are at least two problems with the subjective
measures of health, although the literature typically includes them as controls for unobserved conditions.22 First, perceived
health may be endogenous (Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997). A shock affecting the number of visits, for example, may
also impact the individual’s perceived health. Second, perceived health may be an intermediary output. For example, ADSE
beneﬁciaries would have a higher perceived health if ADSE offered higher-quality services than the NHS. The intermediary
output classiﬁcation also applies to the excluded health status and health habits variables in group 2. In Appendix A,w e
present a simple regression model showing that variables such as subjective health measures or intermediate outcomes may
bias the impact of ADSE upwards, as can be veriﬁed from the comparison of results in Tables 6 and 7.
TheﬁrstsegmentsofTables6and7showtheresultsobtainedwiththewholesample(N= 21,151, N1 =2251andN=21,908,
N1 =2326 respectively where N1 refers to treated individuals). The ﬁrst two rows correspond to the estimated ATT obtained
with a single match (M=1) while rows three and four correspond to the estimated ATT obtained with four matches (M=4).
Note that increasing the number of matches increases the precision of the estimates at the cost of greater bias. Row ﬁve
shows the unconditional difference between the ADSE and the NHS-only group. Row six shows the coefﬁcient of the ADSE
dummy in an OLS regression.23 The three bottom segments in Tables 6 and 7 show the estimated ATT obtained after splitting
the sample into three age groups.24
Results show that, especially for number of visits to the doctor, the simple matching estimator of ATT produces at times
very different results from the bias-adjusted matching estimator. As discussed in the previous section, the simple matching
estimatorisbiasedwhentherearecontinuouscovariates,asisthecasefortheagevariable.Hence,weregardthebias-adjusted
estimates as more reliable.
Table 6 shows that, for the overall sample, the simple matching produces a strong and statistically signiﬁcantly different
from zero ATT for number of visits to the doctor whereas the bias-adjusted matching shows a small and not statistically
signiﬁcantly different from zero effect. For number of tests, the difference between the simple matching and the bias-
adjusted ATT is smaller and both estimates are positive and statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. The statistically
insigniﬁcant impact of ADSE on number of visits and the larger effect on number of tests may have several explanations:
ﬁrst, the heterogeneity of visits, e.g., the requirement to visit a GP before the ﬁrst visit to a specialist, artiﬁcially increases the
numberofvisitsfortheNHS-onlygroup;second,higher-qualityservicesprovidedtotheADSEgroupmayreducethenumber
of visits needed to treat the same condition; third, the ADSE group is unobservably healthier, which would occur if the ADSE
group enjoyed better services. To isolate the latter bias we present the estimated ATT by age group with the conviction
that, if it exists, the bias should be larger for the older generation, which has had more time to accumulate health beneﬁts
relative to their NHS-only counterparts, and smaller or inexistent for the younger generation. The estimation by age group
improved the quality of the matching thereby reducing the disparity between the simple matching and the bias-adjusted
ATT estimates.
The youngest cohort in Table 6 has the largest estimated ATT for number of visits. The ATT of 0.533 (bias-adjusted and
M=1) represents 48% of the average number of visits for that cohort and is highly statistically signiﬁcantly different from
20 Results were obtained from running different versions of the Abadie and Imbens Matlab programs provided on their web pages.
21 We excluded diabetes from matching for the eldest cohort because it may be the outcome of bad eating habits and, therefore, related to the quality
of health services received. In contrast, diabetes is more likely to be a genetic condition for the youngest cohorts. In previous versions of the paper,w e
estimated the ATT leaving out only subjective health measures, which led to higher values than the ones obtained in Table 7.W em a yr e g a r dt h eA T T
estimates in Table 7, therefore, as the most conservative estimates.
22 One of the problems with perceived measures of health identiﬁed in the literature is their sensitivity to the order of questions in the survey. It has been
shown that if perceived health is asked at the outset, individuals tend to tell the truth. This is the case in the Portuguese Health Survey.
23 ReportedstandarddeviationsfortheunconditionalmeandifferenceandtheOLSregressionarecorrectedforclustering.Thiscorrectionmaybeimportant
since more than one family member may be present in the sample, implying error terms are not independent. Correcting for clustering, however, hardly
affected the standard deviations.
24 The variance for the ATT has been calculated using one match and allowing for heteroskedasticity. Regarding the metric used to measure the distance
between covariates, let ||x||  =(x Vx)1/2 be the vector norm with positive deﬁnite weight matrix V and deﬁne ||z−x|| as the distance between the vectors x
and z. We follow Abadie and Imbens and deﬁne V as the diagonal matrix of the inverse of the covariate variances.
9zero. As argued, it is likely that the youngest cohort has not accumulated health beneﬁts, so this large effect is solely due
to moral hazard. The second largest estimated ATT (0.342) is obtained for the oldest cohort but here, although statistically
signiﬁcantly different from zero, it represents only 18% of the average number of visits for this cohort. The estimated ATT
for the middle-age cohort is very small (0.04) and not statistically signiﬁcant. The smaller effects of ADSE on the middle-age
and eldest cohorts may be due to the accumulated health beneﬁts derived from better health care over the years.
The estimated ATT for number of tests in Table 6 is typically smaller than for number of visits but statistically signiﬁcantly
different from zero for all cohorts but the eldest. The estimated ATT is largest for younger groups, possibly also reﬂecting
accumulated health beneﬁts from ADSE coverage. The estimated ATT for the youngest cohort represents 65% of the average
number of tests for this age group and 22% of the average for the middle-age groups. These effects are quite substantial.
WhencomparingresultsfromTable6withthoseinTable7noticethat,atleastfornumberofvisits,thedifferencesbetween
the simple matching and the bias-adjusted estimates are smallest in the latter. Also, the exclusion of most of the covariates
in group 2 leads, in general, to a drop in the ATT estimates and, except for the youngest cohort, to a rise in the standard
errors. The estimated ATT for number of visits in Table 7 are still large for the youngest and oldest cohorts, representing 21.8%
and 12.6% of the average number of visits respectively, but are so imprecisely estimated that none of these estimates are
statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. In contrast, the ATT for number of tests is statistically signiﬁcant for the overall
sample and almost statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero for the youngest cohort, representing 15.8% and 30% of the
average number of tests, respectively.
The samples in Tables 6 and 7 may contain more than one member per family. In these situations the error terms are not
independent, which causes a bias in the standard deviations. In Table 8 we re-estimated the ATTs from Table 7 by restricting
the sample to one member per family in order to obtain correct standard deviations. Most results are similar to the ones in
Table 7 except the ATT for number of tests for the youngest cohort, which is now considerably larger and strongly statistically
signiﬁcantly different from zero.25
Finally, we also estimate the ATT for the variable at least one visit to the dentist in the 12 months prior to the interview.
Since ADSE beneﬁciaries have a much higher coverage than the NHS-only group for dental services, we expect a positive
impact of ADSE in the probability of visiting a dentist. Table 9 shows the ATT estimates for the whole sample and for the
age group subsamples controlling for the smallest set of regressors. Results show a positive effect for all the samples but the
middle-age group, but none of the estimates are statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero.26 Chiappori et al. (1998) argue
that when nonmonetary costs are large the demand is more inelastic and this may well be the explanation for the small or
inexistent effect of ADSE in dental care. Alternatively, this result may be the consequence of a coarse dependent variable,
and if instead we had number of visits to the dentist we may have found an effect.
7. Robustness checks
In this section we intend to look deeper at two important issues. First, given the high standard deviations of some of our
estimates, it is important to check the quality of the matching, i.e., whether individuals in the treatment and control group
are really alike. Second, we would like to present some evidence of the exogeneity of ADSE which is our main identifying
assumption.
7.1. The quality of matching
ToestablishthequalityofmatchedpairsusedinourestimationwefollowthesamestrategyasAbadieandImbens(2006a)
in their Table 3. For brevity, we present in Table 10 evidence of the quality of matching only for the variables used in the
more conservative estimations from our Table 7.
First, all the covariates were normalized to have mean zero and variance equal to one. The ﬁrst two columns in Table 10
show the average for the ADSE group and the NHS-only group before matching. The difference between the ﬁrst and the
second column is reported in the third column to facilitate the reading of the table. The fourth and ﬁfth columns represent
25 Due to the high number of zeros and ones in number of visits and number of tests we decided to estimate the ATTs also on the binary versions of
these variables, i.e., at least one visit and at least one test both in the previous 3 months. The comparison of the estimated ATTs share similar features to
the previous tables. For example, when excluding most covariates from group 2, the simple matching ATT estimates became similar to the bias-adjusted
estimates, the estimated ATTs dropped, and the standard deviations increased for all but the youngest cohort. However, the ATT estimates were, in general,
imprecisely estimated so none of the bias-adjusted ATTs for number of visits are statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. For number of tests, again the
ATTs are statistically signiﬁcant for the overall and the youngest cohort, but only when all covariates are used for matching are they statistically signiﬁcantly
different from zero for the middle-age cohort. Similar to the results in Tables 6 and 7, the estimated ATT is larger for the youngest cohort.
26 Relative to the visits to the doctor, an anonymous referee wondered if we were calling moral hazard to an effect which in part could be the result of
undertreatment. Although dentist visits are not prohibitively costly in themselves, some treatments may be, in which case the patient may decide not to
undergo dental treatment and, therefore, stop visiting the dentist. There are two reasons why we think there is not an undertreatment effect for the variable
chosen. (1) If the NHS-only individuals were subject to undertreatment in dental services due to ﬁnancial constraints, then our estimated ATT effect should
overestimate the moral hazard effect. Yet, given the small and statistically insigniﬁcant ATTs we obtain for dental services, it seems unlikely that there is
undertreatment for the NHS-only individuals. (2) The variable chosen is a dummy variable for at least one visit to the dentist in the last year. One annual
visit to the dentist is perfectly affordable (specially given that we are matching individuals within the same education, and profession, and income group
(and there are 10 income groups and a no-reply group). The undertreatment argument would be more plausible if we were using number of dentist visits.
10the average of the covariates for the ADSE and NHS-only groups, respectively, computed with those observations used in the
single matching case (M=1). The sixth and seventh columns represent the average difference within the matched pairs for
each covariate and its standard deviation.
Thematchingisnotperfect.However,formostvariablesthedifferenceinaveragesbetweenthetreatmentandthecontrol
group is much smaller after the matching than before the matching (compare columns 3 and 6). In fact, only for three of the
covariates (age, female, and centro) is the difference between treated and control averages higher after the matching. The
large size of the difference in averages after matching for the age variable indicates that matching for the overall sample is
not of high quality and is consistent with the improvement on the matching quality found when splitting the sample by age
group. For a few of the indicator variables the matching is even exact (i.e. student, clerks, skilled agricultural worker, income
C, income D) while for the remaining covariates the average difference within the matched pairs is close to zero and never
statistically different from zero.27
7.2. On the exogeneity of the insurance plan
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on several assumptions. First, we believe that those individuals who expect to use more
health services do not select themselves to become civil servants in order to beneﬁt from ADSE coverage. As argued above,
the greatest beneﬁt of becoming a civil servant is to hold a job for life and, for some job categories, the wage offered by the
governmentishigherthanthewageofferedbytheprivatesector.Moreover,othersubsystemssuchastheoneassociatedwith
thebankingsectorofferbetterhealthinsurancecoveragethanADSE.Still,thereisthepossibilitythatthosewhoexpecttouse
more health services, because they are sicker or because they are more risk-averse, would more likely become civil servants.
Second, it must be true that the state does not select its employees on the basis of unobservable (to us) health variables. As
we argue in the previous section, the government must make a public call for applicants and the process is highly regulated
and objective. Applicants must fulﬁll certain criteria and, apart from being physically able for the job, health status is not
part of the criteria. Third, for the unconfoundedness assumption to hold, it must be the case that ADSE beneﬁciaries are
not unobservably healthier, for example because they have enjoyed more years of better treatment. If this holds, then those
individuals who have been ADSE beneﬁciaries for a longer period of time would visit the doctor less and demand fewer tests
than their NHS-only matches; this would imply a smaller impact of ADSE on the old than on the young because the latter
have not yet had the time to accumulate these health beneﬁts. The results by age group discussed in the previous section
show that the impact of ADSE is larger for the young cohort and, at least for the case with all covariates, strongly statistically
positive. This suggests that the unconfoundedness assumption may not hold for the middle-age and eldest cohorts or, in
other words, that there is a long-term effect from ADSE.
In order to support the ﬁrst identiﬁcation assumption (i.e., whether ADSE beneﬁciaries are more risk-averse than their
NHS-only counterparts) we run OLS regressions of risky lifestyle habits such as smoking and drinking against the restricted
set of covariates and an ADSE dummy. We ﬁnd that ADSE beneﬁciaries consume statistically signiﬁcantly more wine but less
whisky. All other lifestyle behaviors were identical in both groups. These regressions do not offer clear evidence that ADSE
beneﬁciaries are more risk-averse than NHS-only beneﬁciaries.
Some people, however, may argue that consumption of alcohol and cigarettes do not reﬂect risk aversion but addictive
behavior. For that reason, we run the same regressions on two additional measures that we believe reﬂect risk aversion. The
ﬁrst additional measure reﬂects preventive behavior and is drawn from the reason for the last visit to the doctor. We say
an individual exerts prevention (prev=1) if the reason for his last visit to the doctor was one of the following: (1) routine
visit; (2) visit related to occupational health often also known as occupational safety and health; (3) blood pressure check
not related to any illness. Any other reason for the last visit to the doctor is not classiﬁed as prevention (prev=0). Moreover,
if the individual did not visit any doctor in the previous 3 months he is classiﬁed as not exerting prevention (prev=0). The
second additional measure is whether the individual brushes his/her teeth (conditional on having teeth). Being a beneﬁciary
of ADSE had not a coefﬁcient statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero in any of the two additional regressions.28
To support the ﬁrst and the second identiﬁcation assumptions, we focus on a subsample of ADSE beneﬁciaries who
obtain ADSE coverage through a family member rather than in their own name. In principle, people who enjoy ADSE through
someone else would only be subject to moral hazard and, therefore, the ﬁrst and second identiﬁcation assumptions should
holdbydefault.Unfortunately,ourdatasetdoesnotallowustoidentifywhetherindividualsarecoveredbyADSEintheirown
name or through a family member. Hence, we restrict our sample of ADSE beneﬁciaries to individuals who are unemployed
and, therefore, cannot be civil servants. This approach is similar to the one followed by Vera-Hern´ andez (1999) who splits
his sample between heads-of-households (in principle, those who make the decision of contracting private insurance) and
non-heads-of-households (beneﬁciaries of private insurance who do not make the contract decisions) in order to test for
adverse selection in the contract of private insurance.
Table 11 shows the estimated ATT for number of visits to the doctor, number of tests, and at least one visit to the dentist
in the previous 12 months for unemployed ADSE beneﬁciaries when excluding most variables from group 2. The ﬁrst thing
27 We have also produced the same table for the matching by age group. An expected improvement relative to Table 10 is that the difference in age after
the matching is always much smaller than before the matching. Results are available from the author upon request.
28 Results are available from the authors upon request.
11to notice is the imprecision of most ATT estimates, which is due, most likely, to the small sample size (878 observations).
We restrict our description to the bias-adjusted ATT for one match (M=1) because the quality of the matches for M=4 is not
good with such a small number of observations. The magnitude of the ATT for number of visits, number of tests, and for at
least one dentist visit are much higher than the ATTs for the overall sample (in Tables 7 and 9), representing 20%, 114%, and
17% of the average number of visits, average number of tests, and probability of a dentist visit respectively, although none
of these estimates are precisely estimated. For number of visits and tests, we expected a smaller impact of ADSE in this case
given that unemployed people do not have to pay copayments in NHS but are subject to copayments under ADSE.
In conclusion, due to the low number of observations, it is hard to perform a conclusive test on the reasonability of our
identifying assumptions. Despite that, the evidence found does not contradict them, and the size of the point estimates
seems to indicate that the ADSE effect is mostly due to moral hazard.
8. Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of additional coverage on the demand of visits to the doctor, diagnostic tests, and the
probability of at least one visit to the dentist within the Portuguese National Health System. Our paper’s contribution to the
large literature on moral hazard is four-fold: First, by using a dataset where 10% of the sample enjoys an exogenous double
health insurance coverage denoted by ADSE; Second, by using a matching estimator technique (Abadie and Imbens, 2006a),
which does not impose any functional form on the impact of health insurance on the demand for health services and allows
for heterogeneous impacts. Third, by estimating the impact of the additional insurance on several services, particularly on
bloodandurinediagnostictests.Andfourth,weallowforadynamicimpactoftheadditionalcoveragebysplittingthesample
into different age groups.
In general we ﬁnd that the impact of ADSE is positive and large. For the whole sample the ADSE effect corresponds to 6%
of the average number of visits, 15.8% of the average number of tests, and 7% of the average probability of visiting a dentist at
least once in 12 months. The effects of ADSE are particularly large for the youngest cohort, 18–30 years old, where they reach
21.8%, 30% and 11.6% of the average number of visits, tests, and probability of visiting the dentist, respectively, for that age
group. Due to the imprecision of estimates we cannot conclude that there is moral hazard in the number of visits since the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is not statistically different from zero. For number of tests, we do ﬁnd evidence
of moral hazard for the overall sample and for the youngest cohort. For the probability of at least one visit to the dentist,
where we expected to ﬁnd the greatest ATT, we do not ﬁnd evidence of moral hazard. We argue, following Chiappori et al.
(1998), that the inexistence of moral hazard for dental visits is the consequence of large nonmonetary costs for this type of
service.
Our data do not allow us to differentiate between the effects of moral hazard and supply-induced demand. The presence
of supply-induced demand would lead to an overestimation of the moral hazard effect. Out of the three variables used to
proxy demand for health services, we expect at least one visit to the dentist to be less sensitive to supply inducement since
ADSE pays dentists per procedure and not per visit, and indeed we obtained the lowest ATT for this variable. However, our
results also show a larger ATT for the younger cohort (18–30 years old) when inducement should be larger for the eldest
cohort who, especially the retired, have a lower opportunity cost of time and, therefore, a more inelastic demand (e.g., Van
de Voorde et al., 2001).
The ATT variation by age group is also consistent with long-term positive effects from ADSE. If ADSE’s double coverage has
a positive impact on individuals health, for example because treatment is of better quality or because it allows individuals
to exert more prevention,29 then, older generations, who have been subject to double coverage for longer periods of time,
may accumulate health beneﬁts and enjoy better unobserved health than their NHS-only counterparts. The better health of
the elder ADSE beneﬁciaries would reduce their demand for health care relative to their NHS-only counterparts. In this case
the estimated ATT for the younger cohort should be larger than the estimated ATT for the older cohorts, just as we ﬁnd in
our results.
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12Appendix A
Here we present an argument for excluding subjective measures from some of our regressions. Denote by y the number
of visits to the doctor and H the subjective measure of health or any intermediate output (for simplicity take H to be a
continuous variable). For notation simplicity assume all other characteristics X are constant then the demand for visits could
be modelled as:
y = ˛ + ˇADSE +  H + ε (8)
H = a0 + a1ADSE + u. (9)
Suppose for the moment that ε and u are not correlated. We check the bias under correlation below. The partial derivative




but the total effect (total derivative) is in reality:
dy
dADSE
= ˇ +  a1 <ˇ if  <0. (11)
The total effect is more interesting. Of course if we do not include H then we would have an omitted variable bias and we
would underestimate ˇ, the partial effect.
Now what if the error ε and u are (negatively) correlated? It is very likely that the shocks that affect your perceived health
affect your decision to go to the doctor conditional on H. That means that all estimates in (8) would be inconsistent and in
particular  . So if we do not include H,
y = ˛ +  a0 + (ˇ +  a1)ADSE +  u + ε, (12)
and we would estimate the total effect of ADSE without bias.
Appendix B
See Figs. 1–4 and Tables 1–11 .
Fig. 1. Estimated propensity scores from probit regressions.
Table 1
Doctor visits by health insurance status
# of doctor visits At least 1 visit (%) N
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
ADSE 1.16 1.89 0 30 0.53 0.50 0 1 4808




13Fig. 2. Estimated propensity scores from probit regressions for the young cohort.
Fig. 3. Estimated propensity scores from probit regressions for the middle-age cohort.
Fig. 4. Estimated propensity scores from probit regressions for the eldest cohort.
14Table 2
Blood tests by health insurance status
# of tests At least 1 test (%) N
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
ADSE 0.30 0.73 0 10 0.23 0.42 0 1 4811





Dentist visits by health insurance status
At least 1 dentist visit (%) N
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
ADSE 0.52 0.50 0 1 4251





Socioeconomic characteristics by health insurance status
Variable ADSE NHS H0: equal means
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. t-Value p-Value
Age 4814 37.53 21.09 40535 42.39 23.20 14.97 0.000
Female 4814 0.558 0.497 40535 0.519 0.500 5.12 0.000
HHsize 4814 3.321 1.187 40535 3.293 1.412 1.54 0.124
Respondent not the individual 4814 0.515 0.500 40535 0.515 0.500 0.03 0.972
Married 4814 0.511 0.500 40535 0.544 0.498 4.33 0.000
Single 4814 0.415 0.493 40535 0.350 0.477 8.72 0.000
Widow 4814 0.042 0.201 40535 0.085 0.279 13.36 0.000
Divorced/separated 4814 0.032 0.175 40535 0.021 0.144 4.08 0.000
Norte (North) 4814 0.212 0.409 40535 0.322 0.467 17.38 0.000
Centro (Center) 4814 0.187 0.390 40535 0.202 0.401 2.49 0.013
Lisboa (Lisbon) 4814 0.312 0.463 40535 0.244 0.429 9.66 0.000
Alentejo (Alentejo) 4814 0.170 0.376 40535 0.115 0.319 9.84 0.000
Algarve (Algarve) 4814 0.119 0.324 40535 0.117 0.322 0.35 0.729
Years of schooling 4814 8.730 5.483 40499 4.858 3.935 47.57 0.000
Managers 4803 0.009 0.093 40488 0.028 0.164 12.10 0.000
Professionals 4803 0.158 0.364 40488 0.012 0.108 27.59 0.000
Technicians 4803 0.084 0.278 40488 0.024 0.155 14.62 0.000
Clerks 4803 0.077 0.267 40488 0.035 0.183 10.75 0.000
Service workers 4803 0.038 0.191 40488 0.060 0.237 7.35 0.000
Skilled Agr. workers 4803 0.010 0.099 40488 0.056 0.230 25.06 0.000
Craft workers 4803 0.029 0.167 40488 0.114 0.318 29.64 0.000
Machine operators 4803 0.026 0.159 40488 0.045 0.207 7.46 0.000
Elementary occupations 4803 0.063 0.243 40488 0.058 0.235 1.19 0.234
Unemployed 4814 0.006 0.076 40533 0.038 0.192 22.37 0.000
Student 4814 0.252 0.434 40533 0.145 0.352 16.42 0.000
Not working 4814 0.246 0.431 40533 0.377 0.485 19.65 0.000
Income A 4814 0.007 0.085 40535 0.084 0.277 41.47 0.000
Income B 4814 0.016 0.127 40535 0.117 0.321 41.25 0.000
Income C 4814 0.042 0.200 40535 0.133 0.339 27.29 0.000
Income D 4814 0.072 0.259 40535 0.128 0.334 13.78 0.000
Income E 4814 0.082 0.275 40535 0.124 0.329 9.66 0.000
Income F 4814 0.088 0.284 40535 0.109 0.312 4.68 0.000
Income G 4814 0.103 0.304 40535 0.085 0.278 4.02 0.000
Income H 4814 0.154 0.361 40535 0.079 0.269 14.06 0.000
Income I 4814 0.151 0.358 40535 0.044 0.205 20.32 0.000
Income J 4814 0.234 0.423 40535 0.035 0.184 32.20 0.000
Income NSNR 4814 0.049 0.217 40535 0.063 0.244 4.14 0.000
Full sample.
15Table 5
Health-related Indicators by Health Insurance Status
Variable ADSE NHS H0: equal means
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. |t-Value| p-Value
Very good health 3207 0.081 0.273 25400 0.037 0.188 9.00 0.000
Good health 3207 0.488 0.500 25400 0.355 0.479 14.21 0.000
Normal health 3207 0.339 0.473 25400 0.380 0.485 4.69 0.000
Bad health 3207 0.077 0.267 25400 0.180 0.385 19.45 0.000
Very bad health 3207 0.015 0.121 25400 0.047 0.213 12.84 0.000
Walking diff. (age >10) 4326 0.009 0.093 37051 0.027 0.162 10.97 0.000
Diabetes 4814 0.036 0.186 40493 0.056 0.230 6.85 0.000
Asthma 4811 0.046 0.210 40501 0.062 0.241 4.75 0.000
Chronic bronchitis 4811 0.020 0.140 40496 0.030 0.170 4.55 0.000
Allergy 4814 0.162 0.369 40506 0.142 0.350 3.50 0.001
High blood pressure 4806 0.124 0.330 40434 0.178 0.383 10.57 0.000
Back pain 4814 0.301 0.459 40504 0.415 0.493 16.10 0.000
Sleeping pills (age >14) 3942 0.124 0.329 34772 0.130 0.336 1.16 0.247
Smoker 4809 0.174 0.379 40512 0.176 0.380 0.23 0.820
Exercise (age >14) 3942 0.166 0.372 34784 0.083 0.276 13.49 0.000
No brushing teeth 4734 0.016 0.126 39905 0.059 0.236 19.79 0.000
No teeth 4734 0.006 0.079 39905 0.024 0.152 12.47 0.000
Obese 3630 0.102 0.303 32434 0.132 0.339 5.63 0.000
Overweight 3630 0.333 0.471 32434 0.374 0.484 5.04 0.000
Normal weight 3630 0.534 0.499 32434 0.472 0.499 7.12 0.000
Underweight 3630 0.032 0.175 32434 0.022 0.147 3.21 0.001
Wine (l) 2039 0.211 0.332 17518 0.264 0.331 6.78 0.000
Beer (l) 1483 0.201 0.381 11634 0.261 0.404 5.61 0.000
Bagac ¸o (l) 388 0.016 0.062 3872 0.018 0.048 0.68 0.500
Whisky (l) 843 0.018 0.044 5608 0.018 0.051 0.29 0.773
Full sample.
Table 6
Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on physician visits and blood and urine tests
Age group M Estimator # doctor visits # of tests
ATT (S.E.) ATT (S.E.)
All, N=2 1 , 1 5 1
N1 =2251 1 Simple Matching 0.215 (0.063) 0.116 (0.026)
Bias-adjusted 0.060 (0.062) 0.096 (0.026)
4 Simple matching 0.158 (0.057) 0.089 (0.023)
Bias-adjusted 0.017 (0.056) 0.042 (0.023)
Mean difference −0.124 (0.048) 0.064 (0.020)
Regression 0.030 (0.053) 0.038 (0.023)
18–30, N=27 4 1
N1 =252 1 Simple Matching 0.623 (0.175) 0.147 (0.049)
Bias-adjusted 0.533 (0.174) 0.137 (0.049)
4 Simple matching 0.462 (0.154) 0.103 (0.042)
Bias-adjusted 0.340 (0.153) 0.105 (0.042)
Mean difference 0.177 (0.158) 0.053 (0.038)
Regression 0.318 (0.168) 0.047 (0.041)
30–60, N=10,422
N1 =1445 1 Simple Matching 0.189 (0.072) 0.082 (0.032)
Bias-adjusted 0.040 (0.071) 0.081 (0.032)
4 Simple matching 0.089 (0.067) 0.033 (0.030)
Bias-adjusted −0.039 (0.066) 0.015 (0.030)
Mean difference −0.124 (0.056) 0.036 (0.023)
Regression −0.036 (0.062) 0.019 (0.029)
60–95, N=7988
N1 =554 1 Simple Matching 0.206 (0.165) 0.108 (0.070)
Bias-adjusted 0.342 (0.163) 0.053 (0.070)
4 Simple matching 0.298 (0.123) 0.126 (0.057)
Bias-adjusted 0.247 (0.121) 0.051 (0.056)
Mean difference 0.001 (0.110) 0.194 (0.048)
Regression 0.093 (0.118) 0.044 (0.051)
Standard deviations for regressions are corrected for clustering. Dependent variables are counts, speciﬁcation with all covariates. Note: Robust variance.
Means of the number of physician visits are: 1.53 (whole sample), 1.12 (18–30), 1.37 (30–60), and 1.87 (60–95). Means of the number of tests are: 0.36 (whole
sample), 0.21 (18–30), 0.36 (30–60), and 0.44 (60–95).
16Table 7
Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on physician visits and blood and urine tests
Age group M Estimator # doctor visits # of tests
ATT (S.E.) ATT (S.E.)
All, N=21,908
N1 =2326 1 Simple Matching 0.132 (0.100) 0.069 (0.028)
Bias-adjusted 0.096 (0.099) 0.057 (0.028)
4 Simple matching 0.054 (0.074) 0.061 (0.024)
Bias-adjusted 0.015 (0.073) 0.044 (0.024)
Mean difference −0.129 (0.047) 0.059 (0.019)
Regression 0.002 (0.055) 0.029 (0.022)
18–30, N=3203
N1 =318 1 Simple Matching 0.279 (0.164) 0.072 (0.041)
Bias-adjusted 0.235 (0.165) 0.060 (0.041)
4 Simple matching 0.225 (0.150) 0.069 (0.034)
Bias-adjusted 0.168 (0.150) 0.060 (0.034)
Mean difference 0.112 (0.133) 0.029 (0.031)
Regression 0.191 (0.148) 0.025 (0.033)
30–60, N=10,501
N1 =1449 1 Simple Matching 0.021 (0.117) 0.035 (0.041)
Bias-adjusted −0.043 (0.117) 0.036 (0.041)
4 Simple matching −0.081 (0.096) −0.003 (0.034)
Bias-adjusted −0.127 (0.096) 0.014 (0.034)
Mean difference −0.127 (0.056) 0.035 (0.023)
Regression −0.059 (0.068) 0.015 (0.030)
60–95, N=8204
N1 =559 1 Simple Matching 0.184 (0.175) 0.072 (0.075)
Bias-adjusted 0.236 (0.175) 0.009 (0.075)
4 Simple matching 0.103 (0.134) 0.092 (0.059)
Bias-adjusted 0.114 (0.135) 0.035 (0.059)
Mean difference 0.011 (0.110) 0.195 (0.048)
Regression 0.094 (0.124) 0.045 (0.052)
Standard deviations for regressions are corrected for clustering. Dependent variables are counts, speciﬁcation with fewer covariates. Note: Robust variance.
Means of the number of physician visits are: 1.52 (whole sample), 1.08 (18–30), 1.38 (30–60), and 1.87 (60–95). Means of the number of tests are: 0.36 (whole
sample), 0.20 (18–30), 0.33 (30–60), and 0.44 (60–95).
Table 8
Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on physician visits and blood and urine tests
Age group M Estimator # doctor visits # of tests
ATT (S.E.) ATT (S.E.)
All, N=16,452
N1 =2,001 1 Simple Matching 0.091 (0.106) 0.075 (0.034)
Bias-adjusted 0.123 (0.106) 0.065 (0.034)
4 Simple matching 0.038 (0.080) 0.060 (0.032)
Bias-adjusted 0.016 (0.079) 0.049 (0.032)
Mean difference −0.123 (0.052) 0.063 (0.020)
Regression 0.026 (0.061) 0.042 (0.024)
18–30, N=2 1 1 5
N1 =235 1 Simple Matching 0.277 (0.220) 0.132 (0.048)
Bias-adjusted 0.256 (0.219) 0.144 (0.049)
4 Simple matching 0.192 (0.196) 0.104 (0.042)
Bias-adjusted 0.183 (0.196) 0.104 (0.043)
Mean difference 0.148 (0.169) 0.051 (0.039)
Regression 0.205 (0.193) 0.043 (0.042)
30–60, N=8032
N1 =1275 1 Simple Matching −0.016 (0.149) 0.036 (0.044)
Bias-adjusted −0.066 (0.150) 0.032 (0.044)
4 Simple matching −0.066 (0.108) 0.016 (0.039)
Bias-adjusted −0.121 (0.108) 0.030 (0.039)
Mean difference −0.129 (0.059) 0.040 (0.025)
Regression −0.033 (0.072) 0.032 (0.033)
17Table 8 ( Continued)
Age group M Estimator # doctor visits # of tests
ATT (S.E.) ATT (S.E.)
60–95, N=6305
N1 =491 1 Simple Matching 0.112 (0.183) 0.103 (0.074)
Bias-adjusted 0.087 (0.181) 0.083 (0.074)
4 Simple matching 0.195 (0.139) 0.080 (0.059)
Bias-adjusted 0.185 (0.141) 0.062 (0.060)
Mean difference 0.038 (0.121) 0.184 (0.048)
Regression 0.136 (0.137) 0.055 (0.051)
Standard deviations for regressions are corrected for clustering. Dependent variables are counts, speciﬁcation with fewer covariates. Sample contains only
one observation per family. Note: Robust variance. Means of the number of physician visits are: 1.53 (whole sample), 1.15 (18–30), 1.37 (30–60), and 1.85
(60–95). Means of the number of tests are 0.36 (whole sample), 0.21 (18–30), 0.33 (30–60), and 0.44 (60–95).
Table 9
Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on the demand for dental care
Age group M Estimator At least 1 dentist visit
ATT (S.E.)
All, N=19,979
N1 =2232 1 Simple Matching 0.044 (0.019)
Bias-adjusted 0.024 (0.019)
4 Simple matching 0.046 (0.015)
Bias-adjusted 0.019 (0.015)




N1 =300 1 Simple Matching 0.077 (0.048)
Bias-adjusted 0.058 (0.049)
4 Simple matching 0.063 (0.040)
Bias-adjusted 0.034 (0.041)
Mean difference 0.099 (0.032)
Regression 0.035 (0.035)
Probit 0.036 (0.035)
30–60, N=97 1 5
N1 =1399 1 Simple Matching 0.024 (0.024)
Bias-adjusted −0.019 (0.024)
4 Simple matching 0.035 (0.020)
Bias-adjusted −0.022 (0.020)




N1 =533 1 Simple Matching 0.063 (0.036)
Bias-adjusted 0.043 (0.036)
4 Simple matching 0.071 (0.028)
Bias-adjusted 0.033 (0.028)
Mean difference 0.176 (0.022)
Regression 0.032 (0.024)
Probit 0.035 (0.026)
Dependent variable is dichotomic, speciﬁcation with fewer covariates. Note: Robust variance. Means of the dentist visit indicator are: 0.34 (whole sample),
0.50 (18–30), 0.40 (30–60), and 0.22 (55–95).
18Table 10
Mean covariate differences in matched pairs
Variable Before matching After matching (M=1)
ADSE NHS-only Diff. ADSE NHS-only Diff.
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean S.D.
Age −0.212 0.025 −0.237 −0.181 1.273 1.454 2.026
Female −0.006 0.001 −0.006 0.145 0.131 −0.014 3.012
HH size 0.051 −0.006 0.058 −0.097 −0.147 −0.050 0.460
Single 0.127 −0.015 0.142 −0.211 −0.344 −0.133 0.621
Widow −0.169 0.020 −0.190 −0.241 −0.363 −0.122 0.597
Divorced/separated 0.114 −0.014 0.127 −0.006 −0.050 −0.045 1.038
Norte −0.198 0.023 −0.221 0.127 0.021 −0.106 0.767
Centro −0.063 0.008 −0.071 −0.169 −0.251 −0.082 0.507
Lisboa 0.205 −0.024 0.229 0.113 0.092 −0.022 0.349
Alentejo 0.089 −0.011 0.099 −0.198 −0.126 0.073 0.840
Years of schooling 1.098 −0.130 1.228 −0.031 −0.041 −0.010 0.249
Unemployed −0.171 0.020 −0.192 −0.217 −0.225 −0.008 0.194
Student 0.190 −0.023 0.213 −0.065 −0.065 0 0
Managers −0.111 0.013 −0.124 0.016 −0.013 −0.029 0.393
Professionals 0.940 −0.112 1.052 1.096 0.862 −0.234 0.719
Technicians 0.509 −0.060 0.570 1.161 0.891 −0.271 0.921
Clerks 0.266 −0.032 0.298 −0.111 −0.111 0 0
Service workers −0.053 0.006 −0.059 0.938 0.931 −0.007 0.201
Skilled agricultural −0.228 0.027 −0.255 0.508 0.508 0 0
Craft workers −0.217 0.026 −0.242 0.265 0.263 −0.0021 0.176
Machine operators −0.064 0.008 −0.072 −0.053 −0.055 −0.002 0.147
Elementary occup. 0.058 −0.007 0.065 −0.228 −0.233 −0.005 0.145
Income B −0.326 0.039 −0.365 0.059 0.047 −0.012 0.219
Income C −0.260 0.031 −0.291 −0.172 −0.172 0 0
Income D −0.129 0.015 −0.145 0.192 0.192 0 0
Income E −0.044 0.005 −0.049 −0.326 −0.329 −0.003 0.194
Income F −0.008 0.001 −0.009 −0.259 −0.265 −0.006 0.238
Income G 0.106 −0.013 0.119 −0.129 −0.121 0.008 0.271
Income H 0.271 −0.032 0.303 −0.044 −0.065 −0.021 0.274
Income I 0.464 −0.055 0.519 −0.009 −0.012 −0.003 0.279
Income J 0.742 −0.088 0.830 0.107 0.089 −0.018 0.323
Income NS–NR −0.026 0.003 −0.029 0.269 0.263 −0.006 0.247
Diabetes −0.097 0.012 −0.108 0.462 0.452 −0.010 0.212
Asthma −0.087 0.010 −0.097 0.740 0.732 −0.008 0.190
Allergies 0.035 −0.004 0.039 −0.027 −0.031 −0.004 0.134
Note: All variables have been normalized to have mean zero and variance 1. The ﬁrst two columns represent the averages of the variables before matching
for the treatment and control, respectively. The third column is the difference between the ﬁrst and the second columns. The fourth and ﬁfth columns
represent the average of the variables for the matched units only when M=1. The sixth and seventh columns represent the average difference within the
matched pairs and its standard deviation, also for M=1. We decided not to show the statistics for month of the interview because it would increase the
length of the table considerably. The mean difference for months of the interview (corresponding to column 5) is between −0.1887 for March and 0.1140
for February but none is statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 11
Matching and regression estimates of the impact of ADSE on physician and dentist visits and blood and urine tests
M Estimator # visits At least 1 visit # tests At least 1 test At least 1 dentist visit
1 Simple Matching −0.067 (1.113) −0.200 (0.193) −0.200 (0.434) −0.067 (0.148) 0.156 (0.184)
Bias-adjusted 0.262 (1.093) −0.079 (0.185) 0.352 (0.613) 0.065 (0.185) 0.067 (0.175)
4 Simple matching −0.100 (0.975) −0.200 (0.145) −0.133 (0.367) −0.067 (0.121) 0.250 (0.140)
Bias-adjusted 0.025 (1.001) −0.028 (0.186) −0.159 (0.483) −0.084 (0.156) 0.064 (0.164)
Mean difference 0.232 (0.835) −0.193 (0.123) 0.095 (0.264) −0.051 (0.104) 0.281 (0.123)
Regression 0.464 (0.849) −0.143 (0.132) 0.130 (0.278) 0.020 (0.107) 0.187 (0.132)
Probit – −0.149 (0.133) – 0.014 (0.103) 0.202 (0.133)
Standard deviations for regressions are corrected for clustering. Speciﬁcation with fewer covariates. Unemployed sample. Note: Robust standard errors in
parentheses. N=878 and N1 =15 for doctor and tests regressions. N=788 and N1 =15 for dentist visit regressions. Sample means of the dependent variables:
number of physician visits (1.30), at least one physician visit (0.52), number of tests (0.31), at least one test (0.25), at least one dentist visit (0.39).
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